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Education supply in universities of most European countries has for the last ten years 
become a strategic matter. At present, French universities consider education supply as an 
investment. But they do not utilize all incentive mechanisms in order to drive their strategies. 
At the beginning of the year 2006, the public sector reform will tend to impose performance 
measurements of research and educational activities, in order to improve organizational 
efficiency. The aim of this reform in the French context is to provide driving elements to 
increase internal efficiency, social and economic impact of higher education system and to 
reinforce international attractiveness of public education institutions. The substitution of 
resources management by result management involves an agent’s performance responsibility 
measurement. Evaluation becomes a central factor and is articulated with incentives system. 
The weakening of the property right system drives project bearers to maximize their utility 
instead of their incomes. In such a context, the understanding of individual strategies permits 
to understand constraints of management within universities, and to take into account the 
impact of stakeholders who take part in the value generation process. The major risk is to 
constraint the utility function of projects bearers by increasing their burden and their 
motivation. The result could be the limitation of the number of projects, and as well, the 
decreasing of university investments.  
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Introduction 
During the last fifty years, the average study duration increased in most western 
countries, and particularly in France2. This increase has become more important since the mid 
80’s. In 1996, more than 40% of the adult population of 21 years of age, and 20% of the 23 
year olds, were students. To compare, in 1946 less than 5% of the 20-23 generation was 
studying in the higher education system (Estrade and Minni 1996). Nevertheless, the positive 
developments in the labor market and the competition between institutions of higher 
education, in particular between universities and private schools, have generated stagnation in 
the evolution of university registrations between 1996 and 2000.  
Kletz and Pallez (2001, p.7) point out that the education supply process resembles an 
expanding spiral with several levels. The study of this expansion can be based on the 
education project emergence mode. The governance team of each university valorizes those 
projects beside the French Ministry of Education, but they are based on the motivation of 
individual academics. Every curriculum is associated with an academic, who is the legal 
representative after the respective dean. It allows him or her to delimit the borders of his 
competences. In the same way, it ensures him to carry out his statutory service of teaching 
duty (192 hours per year) partly or totally in this curriculum. Thus he finds there a full 
discretion to act in the organization. In parallel, the teachers’ career is mainly based on 
research, and teaching can represent one of the means of developing the research tasks, 
mainly in masters or PhD programs (in 2000, 45% of the requests for the creation of new 
programs were for DESS-Masters). This individual logic can also be maintained by an 
intermediate level between the academic staff and university management, by research 
laboratories. They support in a certain number of cases the creation of degree courses in order 
to reinforce and to structure their team of research via new staff recruitment. Thus, they take 
an active part in the search of alternative financing complementing state financing, mostly 
calling upon local area networks (communities, companies). As universities fall from now on 
within the scope of the regional planning policies, laboratories represent an interesting 
interface for local authorities in order to develop a plan of significant curriculum offers. We 
can see different examples of those policies in new curriculum openings dealing with fishing 
industries in Bretagne, with wine in Burgundy or in Bordeaux, etc. 
                                                 
2 The median studying duration value has doubled, from 7 to 14 years (INSEE, 1996). The last census showed 
that students represent 3.5 % of the French metropolitan population (INSEE 2001). 
 3
We will start our analysis with a discussion of the structure of property rights, 
showing how their distribution is particular concerning universities as non-profit 
organizations (NPO). Many problems of incentive and stakeholder management arise from 
both the form and nature of NPOs.  
1. Universities: organizational truism  
Standard economic theory considers the system of firm property rights as given. The 
property rights theory, however, allows justifying different organizational architectures 
resulting from agreements between the participants involved. The property rights system 
guarantees incentives for agents to creating and valorizing assets within organizations, as 
long as the system is properly defined. Further, internal resource use is closer to the optimum 
(Amann 1999). In that sense, the common definition of the transfer of property rights is quite 
general: any exchange of service, item or asset between individual or corporate entities.  
The property rights are the aggregate rights permitting to decide on the use of an item, 
from its conception to its destruction. In such a view, the idea of an asset property is 
interpreted as a residual control claim. Furubotn and Pejovich (1972) go further by defining 
the basis of organizational efficiency as being dependent on the property rights system. 
Agents could get part of the property rights in order to act conforming to the property 
owner’s stakes. In such a case, they become actual residual claimants bearing both risks and 
revenues tied to the property rights in question. Thus, the quality of the property rights 
system definition is the foundation of contractual relations within organizations. Following 
that idea, property rights need to be both exclusive and transferable to achieve efficiency 
(Furubotn and Pejovich, 1972). Exclusiveness is an absolute character of the right, enabling 
the owner to enjoy his property freely. Transferability corresponds to the right for the owner 
to yield his good. Further, the rights of any property can be partitioned, which represents one 
of the basics of incentives within organizations. Indeed, agents can be allotted a part of these 
property rights in order to behave according to the interests of the owners of these rights. 
Consequently, these agents must be counted among the residual claimants, since they bear at 
the same time the risks associated with the rights of ownership and the related income.  
In the case of universities, a weakening of the property rights system can be observed 
because of legal constraints. The difficulty of results measuring and the multiplicity of the 
objectives have led to the state losing control for a long time, as control costs were too high. 
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The result was a tolerance of discretionary practices by civil servants. Because of the 
peculiarity of the education service (and moral hazard), the actors are able to transform the 
potential income into non-pecuniary consumption of goods (improvement of working 
conditions, equipment…). The State would then have to be considered as a fortunate investor 
investing in a great number of firms, without any capacity to control their management. In 
fact, management of the universities is largely in the hands of their employees (that is, the 
agents), and universities are autonomous to a very high degree. Because of non-transferability 
of their rights, we can foresee incentive and control problems related to this type of activity 
(Amann 1999), amplified by the non-profit character of universities. 
1.1. Property structure influences and performance management within university 
Standard economic theory is not appropriate to explain investment choices within 
universities, because of the latters’ specific property structure. In “My fair Lady”, Rex 
Harrison asked why “a woman can’t be more like a man?”. He thought that if it were the 
case, women would be easier to understand and to live with. Winston (1997) uses a similar 
metaphor to compare universities and firms. He assumes that as firms, universities would be 
less difficult to describe and easier to manage. Winston’s (1997) first aim, however, is the 
identification of the fundamental dissimilarities between universities and firms, in order to 
use the classical firm theory to show how public organizations work. His analysis is based on 
Hansmann’s study (1980). Universities are defined beginning with the constraint of non-
distribution, according to which the NPO can make profits but cannot distribute them to those 
having a right to them. Indeed, these organizations do not have owners in the strict sense, and 
it is particularly difficult to identify residual claimants in such an environment. One can 
nevertheless observe that the university, as a perennial institution3, allowed the emergence of 
alternate mechanisms of control in order to solve the problems that can appear between 
stakeholders (Brown 1997).  
But if that structure is not efficient, why is it that the university is organized in the 
form of collective decision institutions? In the American context, Fama and Jensen (1983a) 
find a response in the fact that many universities are financed by donations. In France, 
                                                 
3 The Sorbonne University was founded in 1257 in Paris. It got its name from the French theologist Robert de 
Sorbon (1201-1274), chaplain of King Louis IX (Saint Louis). The university (universitas) of Paris was born, 
under the aegis of the clergy at the beginning of the 12th century with the Lateran pacts. It was also in the 
beginning a school of theology and philosophy whose professors were remunerated by the students coming from 
many countries. 
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however, even though universities are entitled to receive this type of endowment, donations 
or legacies are not really common. Moreover, universities are not homogeneously organized. 
In many establishments, the major decisions are taken by representative councils, whereas 
they are taken by full-time administrators in other institutions. McCormick and Meiners’ 
study (1988) shows a negative impact of administrative load on academic careers. Indeed, 
according to their findings, university teachers taking an active part in the management of 
their institution are those who both publish less and teach less. The Alchian-Demsetz scheme 
(1972), it is however particularly difficult to identify and to control the production process in 
this type of organization, in particular because of the intangible character of the service and 
its production process. In the same way, Coleman (1973) described academics as a group of 
semi-autonomous employees, with only limited attachment to their employer. In order to 
attract these individuals, universities do not only use the salary argument4, but also insist on 
working conditions, scientific accompaniment of research, discharges from teaching (careers 
being managed nearly exclusively on scientific criteria) in research centers (Clotfelter 1999). 
Within universities, the partners, that are, the state, the communities and companies 
(especially via the payment of “training tax” - taxe d’apprentissage) find it very difficult to 
control the quality of the products provided. Donators, however, prefer giving to 
organizations, such as universities, whose statutes do not allow organizational surpluses 
distribution to their members, particularly because of the difficulty and the cost of control for 
this category of stakeholders (Weisbrod 1988, p.30). But the non-distribution constraint does 
not exclude risks of shirking and does not ensure that the funds are used as donators wishes. 
In the same way, contractual theories can also prove conceptually difficult. Economic 
analogies starting with the private firm model can be only of limited use for understanding 
the operation of higher education organizations (Winston, 1997). Agency costs are among the 
most important problems: managers are ready to invest most of the organization’s resources 
for maximizing their own utility. Alchian (1987, p.187) writes on this subject that one of the 
methods that persons in charge of degree programs use for increasing their utility is to 
substitute maximization of their utility for maximization of their profit. This means for them 
“a quieter, more peaceful, even if less profitable life”. He recognizes that the major difference 
between universities and other organizational forms consists of the impossibility of 
identifying the residual claimants.  
                                                 
4 In France, salaries are fixed by the ministry of education according to a grid of indexes, depending on the 
seniority in the rank.  
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The participation of academics in the decision-making process (management and 
investment) is necessary for calling upon their expertise, in particular in terms of curriculum 
design. But by turning teachers into actual residual claimants of universities, the state, as a 
true holder of property rights, allows them to control the decisions of the university 
management. These management decisions could have an impact on the career opportunities 
for academics (promotion to a higher rank), concerning with teaching arrangements and  
related administrative responsibilities. It is likely that the academics concerned would act as 
opportunists when investment decisions are taken. For Hansmann (1996, p.238), a NPO, 
headed by a board of directors exclusively composed from local academics, represents the 
highest degree of separation between property and control functions. The managers are able 
to act without any supervision by a group or individuals being interested in the use of the 
residual income. And one can then expect that in this case the costs of agency are the highest. 
1.2. Decisional process dynamic within universities 
The property rights theory, as we presented it in the first part of this article, seems to 
be an appropriate framework. In reference to the developments mentioned above, we will 
analyze the decision-making process on the basis of two closely dependent concepts, the 
residual decision rights on the one hand, and the control rights (management and control) on 
the other hand. According to the incomplete contracts theory, organizational forms can need 
to solve conflicts arising from contractual incompleteness. In this sense, Grossmann and Hart 
(1986) define property as a function of two principal characteristics: the allocation of residual 
decisional rights (the right to control), and the appropriation of residual incomes5. Thus, 
within an entrepreneurial organization, it is the owner who takes the residual decisions. The 
latter undergoes all the consequences of his/her decisions by bearing the residual risk (profits 
or losses). On the contrary, public organizations are characterized by a determining role of 
the public person (the state or local authorities), who bears at the same time the residual 
decisions and the residual risk resulting from this situation (Charreaux 1997). The 
universities can be placed in this last category. The allowed residual incomes can be 
quantified only in terms of utility differentials, and much more rarely in pecuniary terms. As 
the incentives for public managers are weak (non-distribution constraint), their discretionary 
                                                 
5 The appropriation of residual incomes (profit or loss) symbolizes the appropriation of the profits associated 
with the possession of the asset. This possession confers residual decision rights, whose attribution is not 
envisaged by the contract. This concept of profits or losses covers monetary profits as well as variations of 
utility (deterioration of quality of life, autonomy, working conditions etc.). 
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behavior is not apparent. In fact, the absence or weakness of control implies that leaders of 
public organizations have a more important liberty to decide, and the freedom to implement 
policies that enable them to enjoy higher rents (Charreaux 1997, p.5). According to the 
effectiveness principle, the organizational architecture supposedly contributes to the 
generation of maximum organizational value, and to leading to the minimization of agency 
costs and transaction costs. This situation would call for a weak separation between the 
control and decision functions. 
Contrary to the capitalist firm, it is particularly tricky to identify the owners or the 
holders of residual claims within a university. And the market does not represent much of an 
actual control tool for a university’s managers. One can observe, however, that the university 
as a perennial institution allowed the emergence of alternate mechanisms of control in order 
to solve the various problems that can arise between the stakeholders (Brown 1997) and 
allow the reduction of agency costs. The main difficulty coming from the non-distribution 
constraint resides in the agents’ incentives, and principally for the agents taking part in 
investment decisions, such as creations of curricula, or in the management of an institution. 
These same managers (deans, academics in charge for a degree program, etc.) are ready to 
invest most of the organization’s resources to maximize their own utility, in order to 
circumvent this constraint. In fact, academics must also be considered as being and seeking to 
maximize their well-being, by pursuing goals corresponding to the framework of their own 
utility function. For this purpose, they manage their spare time according to the utility they 
draw from their various opportunities: research, administration, leisure, and lastly, paid 
external activities, thus allowing them to increase their incomes (Charreaux 1995). A 
UNESCO study (1992) has highlighted teachers’ de-motivation and its impact on the quality 
of their work. The study highlights a problem connected to the structure of the teaching body 
(primarily comprised of men6, with a high average age) and on the problem of the recognition 
of their status. As academics’ career evolution is highly dependent on scientific recognition, 
they tend to devote their resources to the development of academically recognized activities, 
leading to promotion in their career. Within such a framework, they can be brought to 
develop their scientific career in comparison to their teaching or administrative duties, in 
particular because of the opportunity cost related to the distribution of their working time. 
                                                 
6 In 1998-99, 14% of tenured professors were women, 72% of tenured professors were less than 50 years old. 
(Ministry of Education, 2000) 
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What is more, they can negotiate time compensation for increased participation in the 
administrative management of their university or department.  
In fact, the universities’ property structure affects their organizational architecture7, 
defined as the combination of the system of distribution of these rights and the system of 
coordination and control. It is thus advisable to analyze the impact of the structure of property 
on each of these components. The various stakeholders, in the center of the decision-making 
process, provide resources necessary for investment. The recourse to the positive agency 
theory envisages the analysis of the mechanisms by which “the relations of the firm with its 
capital suppliers, or more generally the whole of the stakeholders, influence the strategy, the 
decision-making methods and the value generation and the value repartition” (Charreaux 
1999, our own translation).  
2. Toward a stakeholder approach of value generation and value 
distribution in French universities 
Concerning higher education, McCormick and Meiners (1988) wondered about the 
effects of the various organizational forms on productivity, and consequently on value 
generation. The authors characterize this relationship by the alienability of ownership rights, 
or more precisely by the un-alienable nature of property rights on university cash flow, but 
also by the incentive system, and the project’s time horizon. Hence, the decision horizons of 
relevant decision makers are limited, and the latter are not generally inclined to include the 
present value of all the costs and benefits in their projects. In this way, NPOs are directed 
towards positive net value projects, whereas one could have thought that the selection criteria 
would be more linked to concepts such as equity or social impact. In the same way, the 
decision-makers will invest in projects whose costs will be manifest only in the long term. 
The agency theory contributes to explain the fact that agents have their own agenda to pursue. 
Their agendas will not necessarily align with the principal’s interests.  
2.1 Stakeholder value and stakeholder performance within universities 
We considered universities, like any other organization type, as an interaction spot 
between partners with differing interests. The positive agency theory (PAT) describes a co-
                                                 
7 The organizational architecture theory is interested particularly in the allowance of decisional rights inside 
organizations and in the design of control systems governing the various partners (Charreaux 1999). 
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operative contractual system, based on the principle of efficiency and the remediability 
criterion8. Consequently, governance mechanisms result from a seeking of contract costs 
cutback, with each stakeholder trying to maximize their own utility. The PAT allows 
understanding the behavior of an organization as a function of stakeholders’ behavior. And 
the investment choices can be regarded as the resultant of negotiation between them. Ex ante, 
contractual mechanisms make it possible to align the interests of various partners (under 
cognitive constraints and uncertainty), and the organizational architecture in place enables 
solving conflicts not foreseen by contract. As we considered in the above paragraph, 
Charreaux (1997) suggests a partnership approach of the modes of governance. He segregates 
them according to their degrees of intentionality and specificity. Governance, starting from a 
paradigm of forced efficiency, contributes to explain the process of value generation starting 
from the mechanisms centered on the CEO9. This approach then assumes potential conflicts 
between the different stakeholders, and helps to explain the development of governance 
mechanisms. Those mechanisms help to focus top-management’s activities so as to decrease 
opportunist behaviors. Indeed, the different stakeholders are supposed to follow a human 
behavior model (the Resourceful, Evaluative, Maximizing Model - REMM10), each 
individual being supposed to seek to maximize his personal interest11. They are thus supposed 
to maximize their utility (they are able to arrange their preferences and to consider on a 
hierarchical basis their desires); in such a sense, they are rational.  
Like in other organizations, the utility function of university agents is not based on a 
single argument (maximization of their wealth). As the salary range cannot be fixed by the 
institutions themselves (academic staff are civil servants whose remuneration is not subject to 
individual negotiation), seeking of financial benefit cannot be retained as the single factor of 
satisfaction. Essentially, their utility function does not include exclusively pecuniary 
arguments. Among these arguments, one finds the concepts of academic autonomy and 
independence, in the exercise of their teaching activity and in the choice of their research 
                                                 
8 The principle of efficiency to which one can attach the concept of remediability is: an organization is supposed 
to be efficient if there is not any other possible alternative of obtaining net incomes (Williamson 1987).  
9 “Corporate governance covers the organizational mechanisms which cause to delimit the capacities of the 
CEO, and to influence his decisions. In other words, mechanisms which drive and control his acts, and define 
his discretionary space” (Charreaux 1997a, our own translation) 
10 Jensen and Meckling (1994) lay the foundation of an organizational theory which requires appropriate 
behavioral assumptions to be established. It is not a question of “modeling human behavior so as to explain 
behavior of particular individuals. in particular with respect to a modeling of preferences” (Charreaux 1999, 
our own translation).  
11 It would be wrong to see the maximizing behavior in a normative perspective, leading to a loss of utility for 
the other parties concerned. Altruistic behavior could constitute part of individuals’ utility function who include 
in it in one way or another the well-being of others. It could even represent a potential source of utility. 
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fields (De Weert and Tijssen 1999, p.41). Moreover, this independence is affirmed within the 
framework of the law. Their function of utility includes many arguments including spare 
time, prestige related to the direction of a curriculum, social peace, leisure, better working 
conditions or safety (Amann 1999). “Each one of these actors, or group of actors, has their 
own objectives, aims, projects, strategy, ways to act, competences, which they mobilize in a 
given situation, compared to stakes related to competence, prestige, statute, identity or 
economic profit” (Paquet, 2002 p.156, our own translation). Each individual being rational 
will interact with the environment in which they evolve in order to maximize their utility 
function. It is assumed that individuals act according to a criterion of a desired utility. 
Following this, the utility surplus obtained by an individual might lead to a better 
understanding of investment choices. The principal difficulty lies in the eminently subjective 
character of the utility and the arguments of the function, which are not necessarily 
independent (i.e. an enlargement of discretionary space can be associated with a utility gain, 
coming from both material and nonmaterial elements). Obviously, the utility functions of the 
decision makers are modeled by many social and professional constraints. To misunderstand 
them would inevitably lead to an inappropriate characterization of these actors (Clark 1987). 
Austin, in “The encyclopedia of higher education” (1992), outlines the main 
contextual elements that could influence an academic utility function. There is a strong need 
for academic recognition, because of a considerable impact of the discipline, adherence to an 
institution (school, department or university), with the recognition conferred by the national 
system for remuneration and research activity. Initially, the impact of the disciplinary culture 
can be measured by the processes of socialization of the participants entering the discipline, 
in particular by recruitment processes and the scientific origin of the contenders, sharing both 
analytical frameworks and scientific culture12. This phenomenon is accentuated by the policy 
of certain universities preferring internal recruitments and strongly contributes to produce a 
true identity of academic bodies and disciplines. Clark (1987) identifies the discipline as the 
principal factor of the identification to the academic body.  
Once these various behavioral constraints have been identified, it is then easier to 
understand why academic staff seeks to limit their effort (which can become synonymous 
with dis-utility). Thus, on the one hand, the additional efforts of the staff (and mainly of 
managers) increase the organization value, but on the other hand, they reduce their short-term 
                                                 
12 “(They) enter different cultural houses, there to share beliefs about theory, methodology, techniques and 
problems” (Clark, 1983, p. 761). We can add to this sharing of jargon and values. 
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utility. This phenomenon is amplified by the constraints related to the system of property 
rights within universities. The agents, not being direct recipients of the monetary income 
created, might tend to prefer other sources of utility (social peace, spare time, etc). This type 
of behavior can then lead to free riding, each participant waiting until other recipients attempt 
to create value for the organization in order to use or appropriate it. Thus, these individuals 
fully benefit from the value generation phenomenon but they only bear part of the production 
costs13. Then the profit appropriation proceeds to a private benefit seeking related to non-
pecuniary revenues for academics (i.e. scientific or academic reputation, royalties which 
could arise from the use of time freed up for publishing, etc.). 
2.2 First steps in the implementation of process-oriented performance measurement 
system in French universities  
The key concept is value. The concept of value generation represents one of the 
ground rules for organizational choice. At first sight, this concept is very simple to 
understand: assuring that the firm’s assets and investment projects generate a greater return 
than the cost of capital. In such a process, the investment selection routine is the crucial point. 
Value generation depends on future liquidity flows, and the value generation process could be 
defined as the manifestation of the different decisional control functions. This manifestation 
leads to a generation of organizational rent14 (the compounded earnings over the opportunity 
wages), which is represented by the firm surplus created, once all production factors are paid. 
We can see here that cash flows are central for the strategic decisions of the firm (Caby and 
Hirigoyen 2001). This rather clear-cut frame lays the foundations of value production and 
permits to take into consideration the opportunity criteria for investment decisions, and 
finally for the survival of the organization. It has to be said, though, that its vision of 
organizations is a dehumanized one, as individuals are not given any consideration.  
An alternative theory can be found in the integration of all residual claimants 
(Charreaux and Desbrières 1998), where the analysis is not centered on principals and agents 
only. Every resource provider is liable to take part in the decision process, through decision 
management or decision control. Organizational value created is then defined as the global 
surplus for both producers and consumers; in other words, the difference between generated 
organizational flows and consumed flows. Charreaux and Desbrières also propose different 
                                                 
13 These costs are shared between all participants of the production process. 
14 Rent drives to classical concepts (e.g., Paretian rent, Ricardian rent) that we should develop in order to 
propose a clear definition. The economic rent represents revenues over invested capital cost.  
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ways for measuring stakeholder value, while being based on the definition of the value 
created resulting from traditional finance, they concentrate on the impact of the opportunity 
costs borne by each stakeholder of the value-generation process. Stakeholder value then 
corresponds to the difference between sales valued at the opportunity price and the sum of the 
opportunity costs for the various resource providers. It can be represented by the utility 
variations sum perceived by each stakeholder. The totality of the value thus created is not 
necessarily shared by the stakeholders. Following this, the value generation and value 
distribution process could be described as the decision function chain conducting to an 
organizational rent. According to the effectiveness principle, rent maximization leads to an 
optimal decision process.  
In the light of the argument above, we can see the possibilities that this framework 
offers, in the study of organizations such as universities. Where standard approaches assign 
organizational surplus to shareholders only, Charreaux and Desbrières (1998) propose to 
include the various partners of the value-generation process by supposing they are all residual 
claimants. Value generation thus is not any more evaluated solely according to the generation 
of shareholder value but considering the entirety of the partners involved. The authors thus 
substitute the concept of stakeholder value for shareholder value, and establish the link 
between generation (and distribution) of value and governance15. They point out the first step 
of the investment process analysis in organizations (such as NPOs) that were not covered by 
standard analyses up until now, by proposing a measure of the value independent of its 
measurable nature16 (Zingales, 2000). The emergence of this analytic frame enables to clarify 
the investment process in universities, without taking any account of the restrictive 
framework imposing a purely financial (centered on shareholders) vision of the firm. At the 
same time, this approach rejects the assumption that decisions on value generation and on 
value distribution are to be regarded as separate. But the essential contribution of this 
enlarged vision lies in the inclusion of each partner’s contribution in the generation of value. 
                                                 
15 Contrary to this, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) define corporate governance as a means for capital providers to 
safeguard their investment. Charreaux and Desbrières (1998) rather use a definition covering all mechanisms 
governing managers’ behavior and their discretionary scope (Charreaux 1997a).  
16 Indeed, for lack of a performance indicator, research in finance remained confined for a long time on the 
analysis of the relation shareholder-chief executive (principal-agent). Such a relation was quite simple to 
correlate with the market value of firms. “However, it is not useless to recall that this measurement does not 
reflect the entire value created (i.e. the stakeholder value), only under extremely strict assumptions as to the 
operation of the various markets, which are far from being satisfied and which will never be, the generation of 
value passing by imperfections in the markets, in particular asymmetries of information. It thus appears 
necessary, even if the cost is increased in this way, to direct research towards other approaches (perhaps more 
qualitative) of the value created” (Charreaux and Desbrières opus quoted, p.85, our own translation).  
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Thus, the influence they exert on organization strategy and the repartition of the value created 
becomes clear17.  
Moreover, the residual value, or “slack”, is left with the discretion of the manager, 
enabling him to enjoy negotiation funds maximizing his own utility. In universities, because 
of the absence of surplus transferability, this slack makes it possible to constitute reserves or 
to buy social peace between the internal stakeholders. This residual value takes the form of 
non-pecuniary revenues18. These revenues or rents can then be utilized for private (or 
individual) use. They can assume various forms: for instance, reputation aspects, which 
represent a central factor in the utility function of the academics. We can see here the effects 
of a competitive market for academics, sanctioning deviating behaviors that induce 
substantial costs for the individuals (or institutions which employ them) who would not adopt 
usual behaviors (publications, major role in the running of the institution) (Brickley and al. 
2000 p.161). On the other hand, behavior not seeking to appropriate “slack” can contribute to 
provide private incentives and to point out the individuals who adopt these behaviors both on 
the academic and labor market19. 
We define university rent with the help of Koenig (1999, p.226), in turn based on 
Penrose’s (1952) and Porter’s (1986) works, as “the factor remuneration surplus over its 
opportunity cost”. It is a super-normal profit in terms of a normally competitive situation. 
Charreaux and Desbrières (1998) put forward a more complete measure of the rent, including 
organizational capital as a whole. They suggest, starting from their analysis of stakeholder 
value, a solution with revenue measurement as an organizational social optimum: total 
surplus left of the difference between the opportunity costs of the production factors and the 
products of the firm, evaluated at their opportunity price. Operationally, this addition to the 
                                                 
17 In this vision of the organization, it is the degree of effective participation by different stakeholders which is 
taken into account, separating the decision-making process into decision management functions and decisions 
control functions. Further, the value created could be shared between stakeholders who are most likely to be 
affected by a CEO’s behavior (Charreaux and Desbrières 1998). 
18 The aim of an organization in general is expressed rather in terms of economic rent maximization than profit 
maximization. A firm that only maximizes its profit instead of its economic rent (by investments returns that 
yield less than the invested capital cost) is destroying value. Economic rent is closely related to organizational 
competitive advantage that is to be maximized. Those rents can be retained only by the acquisition and 
development of strategic resources.  
19 These reputation aspects are generally strongly represented in the individual utility function when the 
revenues resulting from avoidance behaviors, or fraud, are weak; or when the probability of detecting the 
individual cheating is high. In the same way, we can observe the same when the relation between the 
stakeholders is repeated in the long term, where the outputs arising from the maintenance of a good reputation 
are high. Contrary to this, when these conditions do not converge, the reputation aspects are less of an incentive 
for the stakeholders.  
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value concept could be identified in various ways, at the same time in monetary terms and in 
human capital terms. 
In the case of universities, the organizational rent results from the wealth increase, 
directly arising from the “sale” of education products and scientific services. It could be 
calculated at the opportunity price practiced on the higher education market. The opportunity 
price can be easily obtained for curricula for which there is competition (such as engineering 
degrees, or courses in management, with respect to competition from business and 
engineering schools from the private sector). The combined products of the universities’ 
function of production are the baseline of the rent distribution process in higher education 
organizations20. In fact, cash inflows result from an increase of the student population, 
representing the real objective of the institution, in particular because of the quest for 
permanence and the impact of reputation. We can note a correlation between the size of the 
institution and its success and quality, or at least the diversity of its educational offer. This 
objective is pursued by agents seeking economies of scale in the execution of administrative 
and teaching tasks (Anthony and Govindarajan 2000). The revenues in question can be 
preserved only by the possession of strategic resources or core competences.  
Conclusion 
The conclusions arising from the discussion of the structure of university property 
rights encourages us to consider the question of the dialogue within the framework of the 
investment decisions and through the influence of property rights on incentives and control 
systems. The fiduciary constraint of the non-distribution of cash-flows influences to a great 
extent the contractual relations within universities, and consequently the structure even of an 
incentive system. The agents are supposed to seek to circumvent the control system in order 
to appropriate the organization surpluses in one way or another. The understanding of the 
contractual approaches suggested by the various theoretical currents that we discussed here 
                                                 
20 This surplus is strongly correlated with the number of students (in professional education) because of the 
public financing calculus related to universities. The model allows analyzing each institution’s needs, comparing 
on the one hand its theoretical endowment to its effective one, and on the other hand education demand and 
supply. It further enables the establishment of those pedagogical needs that are not met by the university 
teachers presently employed by the university in question, and consequently, the theoretical demand for 
financial funds for running the institution. In the year 2000, French universities received FF4.7bn (85% of the 
budget covered by the respective law, chapter 36-11) for covering running costs calculated according to the 
model SAN REMO. Nevertheless, use of this model is not unproblematic, especially with respect to the time lag 
between exercises and funding. The theoretical financial support for running an institution is determined on the 
basis of student numbers two years prior to demand and not according to future projections. Development of 
demand thus is not taken into account. Other financing bodies would be likely to utilize other models for 
establishing their contribution. 
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leaves unresolved the question of the inciting character related to the decision of investment. 
Why do academics taking part in the investment decision (and consequently in the process of 
control21 from taking that decision) if they are not directly encouraged to? In fact, the 
question of the impact of property rights on the decision-making process in public 
organizations remains open. As we suggested in our first part, the incentives related to the 
function of the decision makers are of a non-pecuniary nature, and contribute to influence the 
decisions within the framework of the investment process in universities. The broader vision 
of the organization that we developed here enables us to identify the various mechanisms 
intervening in the co-operation process, in particular in terms of alignment of the various 
recipients’ interests. The study of internal efficiency led us to study the distribution of the 
functions of control of the decision between the contracting members. For an interpretation of 
the residual claims in the universities closer to Hansmann’s one22 than the one proposed by 
Fama and Jensen (1983b), it is essential to take into account within the framework of external 
efficiency the individuals who are not directly (by means of contract) involved. Indeed, those 
are likely to have an influence using institutional supports, the organizational decisions being 
able to affect their well-being in one way or another. 
In such a context, performance measurement should be stakeholder-based, in order to 
involve the whole partner’s utility function23. Furthermore, it seems to be essential that 
measures do not lay on financial values, but integer non-financial measures (Antony and 
Young, 2002). The substitution of resources management by result management involves an 
agent’s performance responsibility measurement. Evaluation becomes a central factor and is 
articulated with incentives system. The weakening of the property right system drives project 
bearers to maximize their utility instead of their incomes. In such a context, the understanding 
of individual strategies permits to understand constraints of management within universities, 
and to take into account the impact of stakeholders who take part in the value generation 
process. The major risk is to constraint the utility function of projects bearers by increasing 
                                                 
21 Via the management or the control of the decision. 
22 Education, and particularly higher education, has peculiar characteristics much unlike other products or 
services. It represents services for which the customers pay at the same attention to the producers’ 
characteristics, but also to the other customers’ characteristics. Hansmann (1998) qualifies these services as 
associative (a student would thus not choose only one university compared to the offer of education, but also 
compared to his personal courses and with the social experiment that the university can offer to him). In fact, the 
residual credit, and the concept of value generation as well, cannot be understood for the various stakeholders 
(in particular for the consumers of the educational product), by merely comparing their monetary dimension. 
23 The integration of individuals’ utility seems to be essential to the success of monitoring in peer managed 
organizations. One of the main difficulties is that managers are not professionals in universities. They are 
academics and are not evaluated on their abilities to drive organizations, notably because there is no incentive to 
manage. Then it seems difficult to draw formal limitations or restrictions. 
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their burden and their motivation. The result could be the limitation of the number of 
projects, and as well, the decreasing of university investments. The French public reform 
drives managers to give figures that had never been used before, and furthermore that had 
never been used to drive fund raising. Actually, the result management is a real revolution for 
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